This paper extends the work of Karni (2010) to allow for the possibility that decision-makers' effect-dependent risk attitudes are also affected by their actions. This extension is essential for modeling decision situations in which actions have a monetary dimension that creates interaction between actions and wealth.
Introduction
In this paper I generalize the model of Karni (2010) , allowing for action-bet interaction and, consequently, the possibility that the decision maker's risk attitudes may be affected not only by the effects but also by his actions.
Consider the following example which, in addition to motivating the extension, also lends concrete meaning to the abstract model described below. A homeowner must decide which measures should he take to protect his property against theft and fire (e.g., installing an alarm system, lights, fortified doors and windows, sprinklers and a safety deposit box, having regular inspection of the electrical wiring, etc.). At the same time, the homeowner must also decide whether to take out a homeowner insurance policy, and if he decide to do so, what sort of coverage should the policy include. Before taking self-protecting actions and buying insurance, the homeowner may receive information concerning crimes and theft in the neighborhood in which he lives, which is pertinent to his decision. The homeowner is supposed to be able to design a contingent plan that specifying the measures of self-protection to be implemented and insurance policy to be taken out, contingent on the information available at the time the decision must be made. Karni (2010) introduced a analytical framework that consists of a set, Θ, of effects, depicting physical phenomena on which the decision maker may place bets and which may or may not impact his well-being; a set, B, of such bets; a set, A, of actions, or initiatives, the decision maker can take in the belief that he can affect the likelihoods of ensuing effects; and a set of signals,X, received before taking actions and choosing bets which may be relevant for his assessment of the likelihoods of the effects. In the example above, effects are potential losses due to theft or fire, actions depict the self-protection measures intended to reduce the magnitude and likelihoods of such losses. Bets correspond to alternative insurance policies and signals are crime reports.
In Karni (2010) the choice set, I, consists of strategies for choosing actions and bets contingent on the signals received. Decision makers are characterized by a preference relation on I and are represented by
where a I(x) and b I(x) are the action and bet assigned to the observation x by the strategy I;
{u (·, θ)} θ∈Θ are effect-dependent utility functions on the monetary payoffs of the bets; v is the (dis)utility of actions; and {π (·, · | a)} a∈A is a unique family of action-dependent, joint, subjective probabilities distributions on Θ ×X such that the prior distributions {π (· | o, a)} a∈A and the posterior distributions {π (· | x, a)} a∈A on Θ are linked by Bayes rule and represent the decision maker's prior and posterior beliefs.
In the example above, actions are evaluated by their effectiveness in reducing the likelihood of property loss and their financial costs. The financial cost cannot be separated from the decision maker's wealth. This aspect of the problem cannot be satisfactorily handled by the model in which the (dis)utility of actions and the utility of wealth are additively separable. Extending the model to address this difficulty is the main objective of this paper.
It is worth underscoring that the interaction among actions and other variables affecting the decision maker's well-being is not limited to financial considerations and may include inconvenience and effort. More formally, the objective of this paper is to develop a model in which representation (1) is replaced by the more general form
where the utility functions {e u (a, b (θ) , θ))} θ∈Θ are not necessarily separately additive over actions and bets.
Attaining this objective requires two main changes to the original model: the axiom of independent betting preferences of Karni (2010) is weakened to include action-dependent betting preferences and a new concept -strings of constant-utility bets -is introduced and incorporated into the analysis. The concept of strings of constant utility bets is a novel idea which, in addition to being essential for the problem at hand represents a significant advance over the earlier model.
These modifications, however, do not alter the methodological approach, which remains choice-based and Bayesian. The choice-based aspect maintains that a decision-maker's choice among alternative strategies reflects his tastes for the ultimate outcomes and his beliefs regarding the likelihoods of the events in which these outcomes materialize. Consequently, the utility representing the decision maker's tastes and the probabilities representing his beliefs can be inferred from his choice behavior. The Bayesian aspect of the model is captured by the fact that new information affects the decision maker's posterior preferences, or choice behavior, solely through its effect on his beliefs, leaving the representation of his tastes intact, and that the posterior probabilities, representing the decision maker's posterior beliefs, are obtained by the updating the prior probabilities, representing his prior beliefs, using Bayes' rule.
Section 2 describes the analytical framework, the preference structure, and the main representation theorem. Concluding remarks appear in Section 3. The proof of the main result is given in the appendix.
2 The Model
The analytical framework
Let Θ be a finite set of effects; let A be a connected separable topological space, whose elements are referred to as actions; let X a finite set of observations; denote by o the event that no observation materializes and defineX = X ∪ {o}. 1 A bet is a real-valued mapping on Θ, interpreted as monetary payoffs contingent on the realized effect. Let B denote the set of all bets and assume that it is endowed with the R |Θ| topology. Denote by b −θ r the bet obtained from b ∈ B by replacing the θ-coordinate of b, b (θ), with r.
Informative and noninformative signals in the form of observation may be received by the decision maker before he chooses a bet and an action, and affect his choice. The decision 1 The interpreation of these terms is as in the introduction.
maker is supposed to formulate a strategy specifying the action-bet pairs to be implemented contingent on the observations. Formally, a strategy is a function I :X → A × B whose interpretation is a set of instructions specifying, for each informational event an action-bet pair, I (x) , to be implemented if the informational event x obtains. Let I denote the set of all strategies.
A decision maker is characterized by a preference relation < on I. The strict preference relation, Â, and the indifference relation, ∼, are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of <, respectively.
As usual, a consequence depicts those aspects of the decision problem that affect the decision maker's ex-post well-being. In this model, a consequence is a triplet (a, r, θ) representing, respectively, the action, the monetary payoff of the bet, and the effect. The set of all consequences is given by the Cartesian product C = A × R×Θ.
Denote by I −x (a, b) the strategy in which the x-coordinate of I, I (x) , is replaced by (a, b) . The truncated strategy I −x is referred to as a substrategy. For every given x ∈X,
. The induced strict preference relation, denoted by Â x , and the induced indifference relation, denoted by ∼ x , are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of < x , respectively. 2 The induced preference relation < o is referred to as the prior preference relation; the preference relations < x , x ∈ X, are the posterior preference relations. An
throughout that all elements ofX are essential.
For every a ∈ A and x ∈X, define a binary relation < An effect, θ, is said to be nonnull given the observation-action pair
, for some b ∈ B and r, r 0 ∈ R; it is null given the observation-action pair (x, a)
otherwise. Given a preference relation, <, denote by Θ (a, x) the subset of effects that are nonnull given the observation-action pair (x, a). Assume that Θ (a, o) = Θ, for all a ∈ A.
The preference structure
Consider the following axioms depicting the structure of a preference relation < on I. With slight variations in axioms (A.4), (A.6), and (A.7), all the axioms below were introduced, and their meaning discussed, in Karni (2010) . I therefore refrain from further elaboration here.
(A.1) (Weak order) < is a complete and transitive binary relation.
A topology on I is needed to define continuity of the preference relation <. Recall that I = (A × B)X , and let I be endowed with the product topology. The next axiom, coordinate independence, is analogous to but weaker than Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle. 4 Like the sure-thing principle, it requires that strategies be compared independently of the aspects (coordinates) on which they agree.
The next axiom requires that the "intensity of preferences" for monetary payoffs contingent on any given effect be independent of the observation. It is a weakening of axiom (A. 4) in Karni (2010) , which required, in addition, that the effect-contingent "intensity of preferences" for monetary payoffs be independent of the actions. To grasp the meaning of this axiom, note that if the payoffs were roulette lotteries a la Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , then the condition would amount to the requirement that, given any action and effect, the ranking of (roulette) lotteries contingent on that action and effect be observation-independent.
This would allow the decision-maker's risk attitudes to be action and effect dependent but observation independent. To avoid invoking the notion of probabilities as an primitive, it is necessary to measure the intensity of preferences in some other way. 5 To accomplish this, I
extend the trade-off method of Wakker (1987) . In particular, fix an action, a, an effect, θ, and an observation, x, and suppose that (b −θ r) ∼ 
000
−θ , (that is, let
then that between r 00 and r 000 must be the same, namely,
To link the decision maker's prior and posterior probabilities, the next axiom asserts that, in and of itself, information is worthless. To state this axiom, let I −o (a, b) denote the strategy that assigns the action-bet pair (a, b) to every observation other than o (that is, I −o (a, b) is a strategy such that I (x) = (a, b) for all x ∈ X). The implication of adopting this strategy is that the action-bet pair to be implemented is the same, regardless the information that may be acquired. In other words, given this strategy, information is useless. The axiom requires that, given an action, the preferences on bets when new information may not be used to select the bet be the same as the preference relation conditional on no new information.
(A.5) (Belief consistency) For every a ∈ A, I ∈ I and b, b
Strings of constant-utility bets
Bets whose payoffs offset the direct impact of the effects are constant-utility bets. Because of the weakening of (A.4), unlike in Karni (2010) , in this paper the constant utility bets are not independent of the actions. This requires a modification of the analysis and a new concept, dubbed strings of constant utility bets.
To grasp intuition underlying the formal definition of strings of constant utility bets, it is convenient to consider first the special case in which the valuation of the bets is independent of the actions. Suppose that the bet e b satisfies the following conditions
, e b´for some observation x, strategies I, I 0 , and actions a, a 0 , a 00 , a 000 . Then, given e b and x, the indifference I −x and the action a 000 . Hence, the difference between sub-strategies I −x and I 0 −x "measures" the difference in the intensity of preference between a and a 0 and also that between a 00 and a 000 . 6 Recall that the choice of action affects the decision maker's well-being directly, (the disutility of action) and indirectly, through its effect on the probabilities of the alternative effects. For the second effect to be manifested, the utility must display some variation across effects. Constant utility bets, and only constant utility bets, are distinguished by the lack of such variations. Hence, the second effect is neutralized if and only if the bet under consideration is constant utility. For such bets, solely the direct impact of the action is manifested. Because the impact of the observations on the decision maker's well-being is through the probabilities, the definition of constant utility bets requires that the intensity of preferences between any two actions be independent of the observations.
With this in mind, consider the observation x 0 and suppose that I 00
These compensating variations imply that, given x 0 , the measure of the intensity of preference between a and a 0 is the difference in the sub-strategies I and a 000 , being observation-independent, is also given by the difference in the sub-strategies I 00 −x 0 and I 000 −x 0 . 6 In this case, the intensity of preferences between a and a 0 is, in fact, the same as that between a 00 and a 000 .
The same intuition applies to the more general case in which the impacts of the actions and bets on the decision-maker's well-being are not separable. In this instance, however, what constitute constant utility bets depend on the actions. Consequently, the difference between the sub-strategies I −x and I 0 −x measures intensity of preferences between the actions taking into account that the associated constant utility of the bets varies with the actions.
Nevertheless, the crucial point remains the same, namely, when the intensity of preference between the actions and the corresponding bets is independent of the observations, the indirect impact of the actions and that of the observations must has been neutralized, indicating that the corresponding bets are constant utility. Formally, Definition 1 A mappingb : A → B is a string of constant-utility bets according to < if, for all I, I 0 , I 00 , I 000 ∈ I, a, a 0 , a 00 , a 000 ∈ A and x, x 0 ∈X,
To render the definition meaningful it is assumed that, given a string of constantutility betsb, for all a, a 0 , a 00 , a 000 ∈ A and x, x 0 ∈X there are I, I 0 , I 00 , I 000 ∈ I such that the indifferences
Let B (<) denote the set of all strings of constant-utility bets according to < .
for every x ∈ X and (a, b) ∈ A × B.
If, for some actions, there exists no monetary compensation for the impact of the effects (that is, the ranges of the utility of the monetary payoffs across effects do not overlap), then, for that action, there is no constant utility bet and B (<) is empty. Here I am concerned with the case in which B (<) is inclusive, and thus nonempty.
In the special case I = I 0 and I 00 = I 00 , definition 1 implies that
Anticipating the main result, this means that
to the same expected utility, regardless of the observation. 
7 I thank Jacques Drèze for calling my attention to this special case.
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Finally, it is also required that the direct effect (that is, the cost) of actions, measured by the preferential difference between any two strings of constant-utility bets,b,b 0 ∈ B (<) , be independent of observation. Formally, (A.7) (Conditional monotonicity) For allb,b 0 ∈ B (<) , x, x 0 ∈X, and a, a 0 ∈ A,
Representation
The next theorem generalizes Theorem 2 of Karni (2010) by permitting interaction between actions and bets. Consequently, the effect-dependent utility functions are not necessarily separately additive in actions and bets. To simplify the statement of the results that follow,
Theorem 3 Let < be a preference relation on I and suppose that B (<) is inclusive, then (a) The following conditions are equivalent:
(ii) there exist a continuous, real-valued function e u on A × R × Θ, and a family of joint probability measures {π (·, · | a)} a∈A onX × Θ such that < on I is represented by
where μ (x) = P θ∈Θ π (x, θ | a) for all x ∈X is independent of a and, for each a ∈ A,
The function e u is unique up to a positive affine transformation and, for each a ∈ A,
Notice that, although the joint probability distributions π (·, · | a) , a ∈ A depend on the actions, the distribution μ is independent of a. This is consistent with the formulation of the decision problem according to which the choice of actions is contingent on the observations. on the money spent. Hence e u (a, b (θ) , θ)) = e u (a + b (θ) , θ)), θ ∈ Θ. In general, actions affect the preference directly, through their associated disutility and the possible associated "wealth effect" on the decision maker's attitudes toward the risk represented by the bets, and indirectly, through their impact on the probabilities of the effects. To isolated the "utility impact," it is necessary to confine attention to strings of constant-utility bets. The idea that, insofar as the utility is concerned, actions and bets are perfect substitutes is captured by the following axiom:
(A.8) (Substitution) For allb ∈ B (<), I ∈ I, x ∈X and a ∈ R − , z ∈ R,
By Theorem 3 and axiom (A.8), for everyb ∈ B (<) and a ∈
Hence, with slight abuse of notations, e u ¡ a,b (a) (θ) , θ ¢ = e u ¡ a +b (a) (θ) , θ ¢ for θ ∈ Θ. This implies the following:
Corollary 4 Let A = R − and < be a preference relation on I and suppose that B (<) is inclusive. Then < satisfies (A.1)-(A.8) if and only if there exist a continuous, real-valued function e u on A × R × Θ, and a family of joint probability measures {π (·, · | a)} a∈A onX × Θ such that < on I is represented by
Moreover, e u is unique up to positive affine transformation, for each a ∈ A π (·, · | a) is unique and, for everyb ∈ B (<) and a ∈ A, e u ¡ a +b (a) (θ) , θ
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a model of Bayesian decision making under uncertainty that allows for effect-dependent and action-dependent risk attitudes. In addition to being applicable to the 
APPENDIX
For expository convenience, I write B instead of B (<) .
Proof of Theorem 3
(a) (Sufficiency) Assume that < on I satisfies (A.1)-(A.7) and B is inclusive. Let I be endowed with the product topology and suppose that |X |≥ 3. 
where w (., ., x) , x ∈X are jointly cardinal, continuous, real-valued functions. 
x ∈X, and θ ∈ Θ. For every given x ∈X and a ∈ A, w (a, b, x) represents < x a on B. Hence
where H is a continuous, increasing function.
Consider next the restriction of < to
Lemma 5 There exist functions U : L → R, ξ :X → R ++ , and ζ :X → R such that, for
Proof: Let I, I 0 , I 00 , I 000 ∈ I, a, a 0 , a 00 , a
and
But (8) and (9) imply that
and (10) and (11) imply that
Define a function φ ( x,x 0 ,b ) as follows:
is continuous. Axiom (A.7) implies that φ (x,x 0 ,b) is monotonic increasing. Moreover, equations (12) and (13) , where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of
conjunction with axiom (A.6) imply that
By the representation this equivalence implies that
if and only if,
. By continuity, (A.2), the conclusion can be extended to B. Let
, o ¢ and let ξ (x) and ζ (x) denote the multiplicative and additive part of φ (x,o,b) . Then, for all x ∈X,
This completes the proof of Lemma 5. ♣ Letα (a, x) = P θ∈Θ α (a, x, θ) , then equations (6) and (7) imply that for every x ∈X,
Lemma 6 The identity (18) holds if and only if
= v (a) for all a ∈ A and suppose that (20) holds. Then equation (18) follows from equation (19).
(Necessity) Multiply and divide the first argument of H by ξ (x) > 0. Equation (18) may be written as follows:
then, for every given (a, x) ∈ A × X and allb,b 0 ∈ B,
Hence H (·, a, x) is a linear function whose intercept is ζ (x) and the slope
is independent of x. Thus
Hence
is independent of x. However, because < a for all a and some x, x 0 ∈X, in general, λ (a, x, θ) is not independent of θ. Moreover, becauseα (a, x) /ξ (x) is independent ofb, the first term on the right-hand side of (24) must be independent of x. For this to be true u ¡ a,b (a) (θ) , θ ¢ must be independent of θ and P θ∈Θ λ (a, x, θ) /ξ (x) := ϕ (a) independent of x. Moreover, because the first term on the right-hand side of (24) is independent of x,
is the unique element in its equivalence class that has the property that u
This completes the proof of Lemma 6. ♣
But, by Lemma 6,
. Hence the representation (5)implies
For every (a,
by the inclusively of B,
Thus, by the representation (27),
For all x ∈ X, a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ, define the joint subjective probability distribution on
Since
Define the subjective probability of x ∈X as follows:
Then the subjective probability of x is given by the marginal distribution on X induced by the joint distributions π (·, · | a) on X × Θ and is independent of a.
Define the subjective posterior on Θ distribution by
and define the subjective prior on Θ by:
Substitute in (27) to obtain the representation (3),
(Necessity) The necessity of (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) follows from Wakker (1989) Theorem III.4.1. To see the necessity of (A.4), suppose that
But (35) and (36) imply that
Inequality (37) implies
But (38) and (39) imply that e u (a 0 , r 00 , θ)−e u (a 0 , r 000 , θ) ≥
Let a ∈ A, I ∈ I and b, b
and, by axiom (A.5) and (34)
Thus
This implies that
But this contradicts (A.5)). This completes the proof of (a) .
(b) Suppose, by way of negation, that there exist continuous, real-valued functionû on A × R × Θ and, for every a ∈ A, there is a joint probability measureπ (·, · | a) onX × Θ, distinct from those that figure in the representation (3), such that < on I is represented by
whereμ Henceû (·, θ) does not represent < . This completes the proof of (b) . 
Equations (52) and (53) imply that
Equality ( To show the necessity of (A.5) let a ∈ A, I ∈ I and b, b 0 ∈ B, by the representation 
